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ABSTRACT: 
The transition from low choice to high-choice media environments has raised new concerns 
about selective exposure. In this context, two types of selective media exposure are relevant. One 
is selectivity based on political ideological preferences and the other is selectivity based on 
political interest. Evidence for both has been found primarily in an American context, while there 
is less research on European countries. This is problematic, since the opportunity structures for 
different forms of selectivity vary across media environments. Against this background, the 
purpose of this study is to investigate the two types of selective exposure in a country – Sweden 
– where the opportunity structures for selective exposure differ from the American context.  This 
study investigates both types of selective exposure in relation to televised party leader interviews 
in Sweden. Based on panel survey data, the findings show that selective exposure based on 
political interest is substantially more important than selective exposure based on ideological 
preferences in explaining exposure to party-leader interviews. To substantiate this finding the 
results are replicated with partisan learning as the dependent variable. 
Keywords: Media Consumption, Selective Exposure, Media Environment, Polarization, Political 
Information 
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The transition from low choice to high-choice media environments has fundamentally reshaped 
contemporary political information environments and drastically expanded the supply of all 
kinds of information. As a consequence, media consumers have more opportunities than ever to 
select and to avoid media content according to their own personal interests and preferences 
(Bennett and Iyengar 2008). These rich opportunity structures, in turn, may increase the 
importance of people’s motivations and abilities when deciding what media and media content 
they expose themselves to (Luskin 1990; Prior 2007). 
 One key motivation to select media content is rooted in people’s ideological leanings. 
Several scholars have argued that when people can choose among a variety of sources, they tend 
to select content that supports their political attitudes and beliefs while avoiding opinion-
challenging information (Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Mutz and Martin 2001).  
 Another key motivation is interest in politics (Prior 2007; Strömbäck and Shehata 2010). 
Not only has the proliferation of media made it more easy to find attitude-consistent or avoid 
attitude-discrepant information, it has also made it easier to find or avoid political information 
altogether. Political interest has thus become a more important predictor of news media use, and 
some studies suggest an increasing gap between news-seekers and news-avoiders in terms of 
their news media consumption (Ksiazek et al. 2010; Strömbäck et al. 2013). 
Both kinds of motivated selectivity present potential challenges to democracy, either by 
an increased polarization of political views and a lack of common ground for democratic talk, or 
by widening knowledge gaps. From a democratic point of view, it can be argued that it is 
essential that people are exposed to political information and opposing perspectives and 
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viewpoints, as it tends to promote political tolerance, more careful information search, and 
political knowledge (Delli Carpini et al. 2004; Mutz 2006; Sunstein 2007; Stroud 2010, 2011). 
Although the evidence for selective exposure is not entirely consistent (Mutz and Young 
2011), American studies have provided compelling evidence for selective exposure based on 
both ideological preferences and political interest (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013; Iyengar and 
Hahn 2009; Prior 2007). Thus far there is however only limited research on selective exposure 
beyond the American context. This is problematic, not least since the opportunity structures for 
selective exposure vary across media environments. Thus, it cannot be assumed that evidence of 
selective exposure found in the US can be generalized to other countries, for example in Europe. 
This holds particularly true with respect to television, where in most European countries there 
are strong public service broadcasting, characterized by norms of impartiality and internal 
pluralism and no partisan channels equivalent to FOX News or MSNBC (Esser et al. 2012; 
Hallin and Mancini 2004). 
Against this background and focusing on television, the purpose of this study is to 
investigate the presence of selective exposure based on ideological preferences and political 
interest in a country – Sweden – where the opportunity structures provide plenty of scope for 
selectivity based on political interest but a narrow scope for selectivity based on ideological 
preferences. More specifically, based on a panel study during the 2010 Swedish national election 
campaign we analyze both forms of selecivity using exposure to televised party-leader interviews 
as well as partisan learning as outcome variables. By doing this, we also seek to highlight the 
theoretical importance of opportunity structures for selective exposure for a full understanding of 
selective exposure in contemporary media environments. The main reason to focus on television 
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is that it remains one of the media sources where most people get their information about politics 
(Shehata and Strömbäck 2014). 
 
Two types of selective exposure and the influence of media system characteristics 
As noted above, the transformation from low- to high-choice media environments has prompted 
a concern for selective exposure to political information. In essence, growing media supply is 
said to increase the importance of personal motivations as predictors of what information people 
consume (Prior 2007). In Changing Minds or Changing Channels, Arceneaux and Johnson 
define motivation “broadly as any goal-directed preference regarding what to watch on 
television” (2013: 52). In other words, increasing media supply makes media consumers more 
likely to select content in line with their preferences (Bennett and Iyengar 2008; Iyengar and 
Hahn 2009; Mutz and Young 2011; Prior 2007).  
In this context, there are basically two types of motivations that might lead to selective 
exposure. The first is rooted in people’s political interest. Increasing supply enables people with 
low interest in politics to consume media while avoiding political information, while people with 
stronger interest can consume even more political information. In the US, this gap in news media 
consumption between news-avoiders and news-seekers has been shown to increase the gap in 
political knowledge and turnout (Prior 2007).  The other type of motivation is rooted in people’s 
political or ideological preferences. Here theory suggests that people prefer being exposed to 
arguments that are in line with their attitudes or beliefs, rather than to arguments running counter 
to them (Frey 1986; Lodge and Taber 2013). This leads to a tendency to select information or 
media sources which people expect will meet such demands (Knobloch-Westervick and Meng 
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2009; Mutz 2006; Stroud 2008). This argument implies an ideological gap in exposure to 
political information. 
The growing interest in ideological selective exposure is largely driven by the US 
experience of increasing polarization in terms of both media and politics (Bennett and Iyengar 
2008; Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Mutz and Young 2011; Stroud 2008; 2011). Apart from the fact 
that the Internet has introduced an almost infinite number of potential information sources for 
citizens in many Western democracies, a significant change in the American media environment 
is the political polarization of the broadcasting system, in particular with the introduction of FOX 
News and MSNBC. In the US, studies have also produced empirical evidence for ideological 
selective exposure for watching cable television (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Pew 2010). Stroud 
(2011), for example, finds substantial ideological selectivity of specific content on television 
(Democratic and Republican presidential nomination acceptance speeches) as well as of 
politically biased news outlets (newspapers, radio and television networks).  
While the debate on selective exposure is primarily based on the US experience, 
important to note is that the opportunity structures for selective exposure vary across countries. 
By opportunity structures for selective exposure we refer to the availability of different media, 
media formats, media genres and media content, and the ease with which citizens can select 
media and media content based on their personal preferences. In some media environments it is 
easier for citizens to find content that matches their preferences, for example in terms of 
ideological leaning, while it is more difficult in other media environments. This holds true both 
on an aggregate level as well as with respect to different media types such as newspapers, 
television and the Internet. 
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We believe the concept of opportunity structures for selective exposure is important, not 
least considering research indicating that media use is influenced by the media environment in 
which people live, alongside individual abilities and motivations (Aalberg et al. 2013; Althaus et 
al. 2009; Curran et al. 2009; Goldman and Mutz, 2011; Prior 2007; Shehata & Strömbäck 2011). 
Similar to other behaviors, media use is shaped by opportunities as well as preferences and 
abilities (Luskin 1990). Thereby, differences in opportunities for selective exposure across media 
environments should have an impact on the presence and ubiquity of selective exposure in 
countries with different media environments. 
Although the growing popularity of the Internet and the multiplication of cable channels 
are more or less similar across media systems, the situation is quite different with respect to 
terrestrial broadcasting. Here, the strong position of public service broadcasting in many 
European countries has (thus far) prevented a political polarization of the broadcasting system 
that has emerged in the US. In many countries, public broadcasters hold substantial market 
shares. They are also obliged to work in accordance with norms of impartiality, objectivity and 
political neutrality (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Esser et al. 2012). Next to the public service 
stations, a number of international cable channels offer pure entertainment programming and 
provide people the chance to avoid news and political information altogether in favor of 
entertainment. Comparing media environments in the US and in European countries with strong 
public service, suggests that the opportunity structures for selectivity based on political interest 
are great across media environments, but more narrow when it comes to ideological selectivity in 
European countries. Therefore, to understand the role of selective exposure, it is essential to 
broaden research to include European countries with different opportunity structures for selective 
exposure than the US. One such country is Sweden, a typical example of what Hallin and 
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Mancini (2004) has identified as the democratic corporatist model of media and politics. Other 
countries belonging to this model are, for example, Austria, Germany and the other Nordic 
countries. 
 
Selective Exposure Opportunities in the Swedish Broadcasting System 
In this study we will focus on selective exposure with respect to television. As mentioned earlier, 
one key reason is that television remains one of the most important sources of information for 
most people. As a typical democratic corporatist country, the Swedish broadcasting system is 
dominated by two public service channels (SVT1 and SVT2) and one commercial broadcaster 
(TV4). TV4 is also restricted by some public service obligations. Although there is a commercial 
cable television market, in terms of news and current affairs SVT1, SVT2 and TV4 dominate and 
attract broad segments of the population (Ohlsson 2015). Together these three channels provide a 
rich opportunity structure for political information.  
In contrast to the US, there are no partisan television channels in Sweden. Thus, it makes 
little sense to study ideological divides in the audience of different television channels. The lack 
of partisan channels does not, however, prevent programming that is partisan in nature. One 
prime example is the institutionalized party-leader interviews that are televised prior to each 
national election in Sweden. In this study, and inspired by Stroud’s (2011) study on Democratic 
and Republican presidential nomination acceptance speeches, we thus focus on exposure to these 
party-leader interviews. In arguing why she studies exposure to presidential nomination 
acceptance speeches, Stroud stresses the popularity and the blatant partisanship of the speeches 
as reasons to expect ideological selective exposure (2011: 42). In comparative terms, the 
televised party-leader interviews in Sweden are equivalent to the acceptance speeches in terms of 
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being central to Swedish national election campaigns and reaching wide audiences (Esaiasson 
and& Håkansson, 2013; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2013). Moreover, they are equivalent in the sense 
that a television viewer can easily anticipate each interview to be either attitude-consistent or 
attitude-discrepant. 
The party-leader interviews are broadcasted live during the final weeks of the Swedish 
election campaign. A pair of experienced professional journalists interviews each leader of the 
parties having seats in parliament for a full hour. The interviews are broadcasted live on prime 
time by one of the public service television channels, thereby providing a unique opportunity for 
parties to get their message across unedited and without having to face political opponents. 
Furthermore, since people know which party leader is being interviewed, they have every chance 
to select or avoid these interviews based on their political interest or ideological preferences.  
With respect to the Swedish political system, it is essential to know that Sweden had 
seven parties in parliament at the time, but also that these parties formed two blocs, one center-
left and one center-right. In the election, the parties in the center-right bloc – who had been in 
government since 2006 – won about 49 percent of the votes while the center-left bloc won about 
44 percent of the votes. An eighth party – the Sweden Democrats – also entered parliament after 
having received 5.7 percent of the votes. 
 
Hypotheses: The Role of General Political Interest and Ideological Preferences 
Turning to our hypotheses, and based on the notion of different opportunity structures for 
selective exposure, our basic argument is that the Swedish broadcasting system provides more 
choice opportunities at the genre level than at the ideological level. As a consequence, we expect 
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that political interest will be more important than ideological leaning in explaining exposure to 
party-leader interviews. Viewing decisions at the genre level refer to choices between watching 
news and current affairs, entertainment, sports, movies, sitcoms, etc., while choices at the 
ideological level refer to the political leaning of a television program or channel (liberal, 
conservative, right-wing or left-wing, etc.) (Webster 2014). 
With respect to party-leader interviews, people with divergent political beliefs have the 
chance to either actively change channel or turn the television off to avoid these interviews, 
while citizens who share the political views of a particular party can tune-in. Following Stroud’s 
findings concerning ideological selective exposure to presidential acceptance speeches, we 
should expect some ideologically driven selective exposure to the party-leader interviews in 
Sweden as well. However, previous research suggests that television viewing is driven at least as 
much by habits and routines as by personal preferences (Diddi and LaRose 2006; LaRose 2010; 
Rosenstein and Grant 1997; Webster 2014; Wonneberger et al. 2011). Following Mutz and 
Young (2011), ideological selective exposure should thus be affected by habitual television 
viewing or channel loyalty. In a polarized broadcasting system like the American, the 
opportunity structure enables citizens to develop viewing habits based on ideological 
preferences, resulting in what Mutz and Young term passive selective exposure. In contrast, the 
substantial audience share for public service broadcasting in Sweden means that a significant 
part of the habitual television viewing will take place on the main public service channels 
(Aalberg and Curran 2012; Shehata et al. 2015). Thus, the lack of opportunities for ideological 
selective exposure at the channel level combined with the importance of viewing habits can be 
expected to reduce ideological selective exposure to specific political content. 
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 Despite this, we still expect to find some ideological selective exposure to the party-
leader interviews. The main gap in exposure to Swedish party leader interviews, we argue, is 
however not between citizens with different ideological leanings but between people with an 
ideological preference – either left-leaning or right-leaning – and those without. This argument is 
based on two propositions. First, on the individual level, previous studies indicate that people 
with ideological preferences are generally more politically active, interested, and knowledgeable 
than people who are neither left- nor right-leaning (Curran et al. 2012; Oscarsson and Holmberg 
2008). Therefore, they are also more likely to watch the party-leader interviews. Second, while 
the Swedish broadcasting system provides limited opportunities to select television channels 
based on ideological orientations, there are a large number of national and international cable 
channels that broadcast entertainment, movies or television shows rather than politics and current 
affairs. This makes it significantly easier to select media content based on general interest in 
politics than on ideological preferences. Thus, while there are ample opportunities to seek-out 
non-political television programs for those uninterested in politics, people who are equally 
interested in politics but divided ideologically are dependent on the same channels for getting 
televised campaign information. 
In this context it is important to note that selecting information in line with one’s attitudes 
does not necessarily imply avoidance of attitude-discrepant information. In fact, people have 
several reasons to expose themselves to attitude-discrepant information: it can be emotionally 
rewarding to argue against such information and reject it; such information can help people 
prepare a defense for their own position; or it could be useful to learn about attitude-discrepant 
information to reexamine one’s own position (Garrett et al. 2013; Knobloch-Westerwick 2015). 
However, it requires a certain degree of political interest to engage in such cognitive demanding 
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activities. Consequentially, those politically interested are more prone to embrace both attitude-
discrepant as well as attitude-consistent information, and this general motivation is likely to be 
stronger among people with an ideological leaning than among those without. 
Based on these arguments we expect to find some ideological selective exposure to the 
party-leader interviews in Sweden, but also that political interest is more important than 
ideological leanings in explaining why people watch interviews. Our hypotheses thus are: 
H1a: People with a right-leaning ideology are more likely to watch party-leader interviews 
with right-wing parties, while people with a left-leaning ideology are more likely to 
watch party leader-interviews with left-wing parties. 
H1b: People with an ideological leaning are more likely than those who are neither left- nor 
right-leaning to watch party-leader interviews, independently of the direction of their 
ideological leanings. 
H1c: General political interest is more important than ideological preferences for explaining 
why people watch party leader-interviews. 
 
To extend our analysis and assess the robustness of our findings we will also test our hypotheses 
in relation to partisan learning. If increased media supply results in less cross-cutting media 
exposure it could lead to low awareness of attitude-inconsistent information, compared to the 
awareness of attitude-consistent information. Thus, by partisan learning, we refer to one-sided 
campaign learning, that is, learning about the proposals of parties with whom voters agree 
ideologically. Partisan learning should thereby be contrasted to general campaign learning, 
which reflects learning about parties from all political camps. 
Opportunity Structures for Selective Exposure    -  12 
 
 12 
Intuitively it would make sense that people remember information with which they agree 
better than information with which they disagree. However, this seems not to be the case (Eagly 
et al. 1999). The tendency to counter-argue attitude-discrepant messages is part of the 
mechanism that makes counter-attitudinal messages as memorable as pro-attitudinal messages 
(Eagly et al. 2000). A similar point is made by Taber & Lodge (2006), who show that people 
engage more in denigrating arguments they disagree with than bolster arguments they agree with. 
Doing so requires a certain level of motivation and political interest however. Therefore, we 
expect to find a similar pattern for partisan learning as for exposure to party-leader interviews. 
H2a: People with a right-leaning ideology are more likely to learn about the proposals of 
right-wing parties, while people with a left-leaning ideology are more likely to learn 
about the proposals of left-wing parties, during the election campaign. 
H2b: People with an ideological leaning are more likely than those who are neither left- nor 
right-leaning to learn about the proposals of all political parties, independently of the 
direction of their ideological leaning. 
H2c: General political interest is more important than ideological preferences for campaign 
learning. 
 
Data and Methodology 
To investigate the hypotheses above we will rely on a four-wave panel study conducted during 
the 2010 Swedish national election campaign. Compared to cross-sectional surveys, using panel 
data provides the opportunity to study how ideological preferences and motivations formed 
already prior to the election campaign influence information selectivity during the campaign, i.e., 
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whether citizens with certain ideological orientations measured months before election day are 
more or less likely to subsequently expose themselves to attitude-consistent and inconsistent 
media content. Thus, by analyzing these dynamics over time, the panel design provides 
substantially better opportunities to capture the causal effect of ideological preferences on 
selectivity and retention (Finkel 1995). The panel survey was conducted by [blinded] in 
cooperation with the polling institute [blinded] in Sweden. 
The sample was drawn using stratified probability sampling from a database of 
approximately 28,000 citizens from [blinded’s] pool of Web survey participants. Those included 
in this pool are recruited continuously using both random digit dialing and mail surveys based on 
random probability samples. Approximately five percent of those who are initially contacted and 
invited agree to be part of this pool of respondents. The pool of Web survey participants covers 
different segments of the population in terms of e.g. residence, age, education and occupation.  
The probability sample of 4,760 respondents aged 18-74 from this pool was stratified by 
gender, age, county size, political interest and Internet use, so as to be as representative of the 
Swedish population aged 18-74 years as possible. Among these, we base our analyses on those 
4010 respondents who were invited to participate in all waves of the panel. These respondents 
were asked to complete a Web-based survey at four times during a period of five months leading 
up to the election. Wave 1 of the panel took place in May (May 3-May 20), wave 2 in mid-June 
(June 14-June 23), wave 3 in mid-August (August 16-23), and finally, wave 4 immediately after 
Election Day (September 20-September 27). The total cooperation rates were 63 % in wave 1, 48 
% in wave 2, 43 % in wave 3 and 39 % in wave 4. However, not everyone participated in all 
waves, but a total number of 1,413 respondents did so – amounting to a 35 % of all respondents 
initially contacted. While the overall response rates are relatively high given common problems 
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of panel attrition, the sampling procedure and final cooperation rates certainly raise issues 
concerning external validity. Compared to available population statistics, the final sample is 
broadly representative with regard to sex, age and geography (county size), but weaker in terms 
of education (47% with higher education in the sample, compared to 29% among the 
population). Compared to cross-sectional surveys based on traditional national probability 
samples, the panel respondents are also more interested in politics (63% compared to 52%) and 
more frequent users of the Internet (92% compared to 78%). Although the primary strength with 
panel data is the opportunity to analyze changes in communication and opinions over time – and 
more specifically, to use measures of personal motivations (interest and ideological leaning) 
collected prior to the campaign as predictors of viewing behaviors during the campaign, we will 
therefore base descriptive statistics on weighted data.  
 
Measures 
Our key variables in the present study are ideological orientation, ideological selective exposure 
and partisan learning. While ideological orientation was measured in the first panel wave, both 
selective exposure and learning were tapped in the following waves – wave 2, 3 and 4. In 
addition, we use several control variables to identify the unique effect of ideological orientation 
on ideological exposure and partisan learning. 
 Ideological orientation was measured in prior to the election campaign based on a 
standard left-right ideological scale. Respondents were asked to identify their orientation on an 
11-point scale from 0 (“Clearly to the left”) to 10 (“Clearly to the right”). A three-level 
categorical variable was created by distinguishing respondents with a left-leaning orientation (0-
4 on the original 11-point scale), from those lacking a clear ideological orientation (5 on the 
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original 11-point scale), as well as respondents with a right-leaning orientation (6-10 on the 
original 11-point scale) – creating three groups of left-leaning (n=1000), centre (n=566) and 
right-leaning (n=1135) citizens. 
 As discussed above the presence of selective exposure will be analyzed in relation to 
televised party-leader interviews. Exposure to party-leader interviews broadcasted on the main 
public service channels in the final weeks of the election campaign was measured in the fourth 
panel wave, based on a battery of survey items asking whether respondents watched each of the 
seven one-hour-long party-leader interviews. For each party-leader interview, the response 
categories ranged from 0 (No) to 1 (Yes, partly) and 2 (Yes, the entire interview). Apart from 
analyzing each of these items separately, we also computed two additive scales: (1) exposure to 
left-wing party-leader interviews (range 0-6, mean value=1.95, standard deviation=1.98) and (2) 
exposure to right-wing party-leader interviews (range 0-8, mean value=2.34, standard 
deviation=2.53). 
 To measure learning during the campaign, the panel survey included several items 
tapping campaign knowledge, i.e., awareness of events taking place and policy proposals 
presented during the election campaign – measured in wave 2, 3 and 4. In order to capture 
potential partisan learning, we focus here on knowledge about specific policy proposals 
presented by the parties during the campaign. For instance, respondents were asked questions 
like: “Which of the following proposals were presented by the left-wing parties in their joint 
party manifesto?”. Five response categories, including “Don’t Know”, were given for each 
knowledge question in order to minimize the chance of randomly guessing the correct answer. A 
time limit of twenty seconds for answering each question was used to avoid Web searches for the 
correct answers. For each knowledge question respondents who gave a correct answer were 
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given the value 1, while incorrect and don’t know answers were coded 0. We identified nine 
items focusing on knowledge about the left-wing parties, and six items about the right-wing 
parties – creating two separate learning scales ranging from 0-9 (left-wing party learning) and 0-
5 (right-wing party learning). Based these items, we constructed a (1) left-wing party knowledge 
index (range 0-9, mean value=3.47, standard deviation=2.11) as well as a (2) right-wing party 
knowledge index (range 0-5, mean value=2.55, standard deviation=1.28). 
 In addition to these focal variables, the panel survey also included a number of key 
control variables such as age, gender, education and income. Most importantly however, given 
our focus on more political motivations and resources, the analyses will account for individual 
differences in political interest and general political knowledge. Political interest was measured 
in the first panel wave (t-4) based on two four-level items focusing on respondents’ interest in (1) 
politics as well as in (2) the election campaign (pearson’s r=0.73). The two items were summed 
to form a political interest index ranging from 0 (no interest) to 6 (strong interest). General 
political knowledge – representing the stock of political knowledge that citizens brought with 
them at the beginning of the election campaign – was also measured in wave 1 (t-4). This is an 
additive index based on eight political knowledge questions focused on personalities (three 
items), political processes (three items), and issue positions (two items) – with acceptable 
reliability levels (Kuder-Richardsson=0.72). 
 
Results 
Table 1 presents some basic descriptive statistics covering initial differences between left-
leaning, centre and right-leaning voters at the beginning of the election campaign. As can be 
seen, there are no major differences with respect to age between these groups, indicating that 
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fundamental political orientations do not follow an age pattern. This is not the case for political 
motivation and resource variables, however. While right-leaning citizens score slightly higher 
than left-leaners on both news attention and general political knowledge, their interest in politics 
is fairly equal. The major gap, however, is found between people who are neither right- nor left-
leaning and those who are either right- or left-leaning. Citizens lacking an ideological leaning are 
substantively less interested in politics, pay less attention to political news in traditional media, 
and score significantly lower on political knowledge, than do both left-wing and right-wing 
citizens.  
 
***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Ideological Selective Exposure 
The research question at heart of this study concerns selective exposure, i.e. the extent to which 
left-right orientations as well as general political interest influence (1) what media content 
citizens turn to as well as (2) what political information they acquire during the election 
campaign. We start confronting the exposure dimension in figure 1, which displays the 
relationship between left-right orientations and exposure to televised party leader interviews. As 
can be seen, there is a consistent relationship between ideological orientations expressed prior to 
the campaign, and exposure to televised party-leader interviews in the final weeks of the election 
campaign. Citizens considering themselves as left-leaning are more likely to watch interviews 
with party-leaders representing the left-wing parties – the Left Party, the Social Democrats and 
the Green Party – than right-leaning citizens are. The gap amounts to approximately 6-12 
percentage points between the two ideological camps. A similar pattern is found for exposure to 
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right-wing party-leader interviews. These are primarily watched by citizens with a right-leaning 
orientation, and this time the left-right gap amounts to approximately 6-15 percentage points. 
 Furthermore, there is another striking pattern in figure 1: those who watch party-leader 
interviews to the least extent are citizens lacking a clear political left-right orientation, suggesting 
again that the primary gap in political information exposure is not due to ideological but to more 
general motivation factors. It is not the ideological divide that matters, but rather whether 
citizens possess ideological convictions or not, which is likely to be related to differences in 
interest, attention and general knowledge as documented above. 
 
***FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
So far, the results presented have been descriptive – revealing a consistent pattern of ideological 
selective exposure to televised interviews. However, even though the findings indicate that 
ideological orientations are related to what partisan content citizens are exposed to – and that 
citizens seem to prefer attitude-consistent information – additional individual-level analyses 
suggests that these types of media use are far from ideologically divided. The bivariate 
correlation between watching party-leader interviews of the left-wing parties on the one hand, 
and of the right-wing parties on the other hand, is very strong (pearson’s r=.80). This again 
suggests that general political motivations – or viewing habits – rather than ideological 
motivations drive television exposure during the election campaign. 
In table 2 we present a more critical test of the ideological selective exposure hypothesis 
by analyzing whether there are independent effects of left-right orientations on television 
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exposure, controlling for a host of socioeconomic background, political resource (knowledge) 
and motivation (interest) variables. Here we use left-leaning respondents as the reference group 
when estimating the effect of ideological orientation. Furthermore, we introduce general political 
interest and knowledge variables sequentially in the analysis.1  
The patterns unraveled in table 2 are revealing. First, model 1 includes ideological 
orientation and background variables only, and the results confirm previous bivariate findings 
indicating the presence of ideological selectivity. They also indicate that voters who are neither 
left- nor right-leaning are the least exposed to televised interviews irrespective of who is 
interviewed. Second, however, this “curvilinear” pattern disappears when political interest and 
knowledge are added to the regression in model 2. Once these variables are added, ideological 
orientation has a more linear impact on exposure to party leader interviews: both centre (b=-.28, 
p<.05) and right-leaning (b=-.42, p<.001) voters are significantly less likely to watch interviews 
with left-wing party leaders, while centre (b=.55, p<.01) and right-leaning (b=.99, p<.001) voters 
are more likely to watch interviews with right-wing leaders – compared to citizens with a left-
leaning ideological orientation. It is also evident that political interest has a much stronger and 
consistent effect on watching party leader interviews than general political knowledge. Together 
these two variables increase the amount of explained variance by approximately 15-18 
percentage points (adjusted R2 increases from 12% to 27% and from 10% to 28% when these 
variables are added).  
The importance of political interest as a predictor of exposure to party-leader interviews 
compared to ideological orientation can be further tested in two ways. First, what is the relative 
importance of each variable in terms of overall contribution to the model? By comparing the 
                                                          
1 Given the character of our dependent variables, we also estimated all models using ordered logit regression. The 
substantive results were however very similar in terms of effects and statistical significance. 
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change in R-square when both variables are excluded from the full model (model 2), one at a 
time, their individual contribution can be assessed. Dropping ideological orientation (the two 
dummy variables) from model 2, yields a decrease in adjusted R-square of approximately 1-3 
percentage points. Excluding political interest, on the other hand, results in a drop in adjusted R-
square of approximately 12-13 percentage points. Second, what is the substantive effect on 
exposure to party-leader interviews resulting from a change in ideological orientation as well as 
in political interest? One way to assess this is to look at the maximum possible effects. For 
instance, citizens with a right-leaning ideological orientation score, on average, 0.42 points lower 
on the exposure to left-wing party-leader interviews scale compared to left-wing voters, while 
the maximum effect of political interest is 3.42 on the exposure scale (6×0.57). Similarly, while 
having a right-wing leaning increases exposure to right-wing party-leader interviews by 0.99, the 
maximum effect of interest is 4.32 on the exposure scale (6×0.72). Although such comparisons 
are not straightforward, they illustrate the relative importance of general political interest as a 
motivation behind party-leader interviews.2 
***TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
Partisan Learning 
As discussed above, one of the key concerns frequently raised is that growing opportunities for 
media choice will not only elevate the impact of personal motivations and preferences on what 
media content citizens are exposed to, but also what information they acquire. In terms of 
ideological selectivity, growing supply is assumed to result in less cross-cutting media exposure 
and, thereby, decreasing awareness of attitude-inconsistent information. Above we found that 
                                                          
2 For instance, while our political interest measure is a continuous scale capturing the strength of this motivation, 
ideological orientation is a categorical variable that does not take ideological strength into account. Thus, going 
from a minimum to a maximum value on these two measures has different implications substantively. 
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while ideological selective exposure does occur, citizens who are exposed to partisan media 
content about parties with their preferred ideological leaning are also likely to be exposed to 
information about the non-preferred parties. Thus, in this regard a more general political 
motivation seems to be what distinguishes people who in terms of ideology are neither right- nor 
left- leaning and those who are either right- or left-leaning.  
The question is whether the same pattern can be found with respect to partisan learning, 
i.e., the extent to which citizens primarily learn about the policies and proposals of their own 
favored parties during the campaign. Figure 2 gives a first glimpse at this issue by illustrating 
partisan learning among citizens based on their left-right orientations. The findings reveal very 
little evidence of extensive partisan learning. While right-leaning citizens are slightly more likely 
to learn about the activities of the right-wing parties, they are also more likely to learn about the 
left-wing parties than left-leaning voters are. Again however, the most striking learning gap is 
not found between partisans of different ideological camps, but between people with no clear 
ideological leaning and those who are either right- or left-leaning. Citizens lacking a clear left-
right orientation score lowest on both left-wing party knowledge (21 percent correct answers) 
and right-wing party knowledge (36 percent correct), compared to the left-leaning (31 and 47 
percent) and right-leaning (38 and 51 percent correct) voters respectively. 
 
***FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
In table 3 we conduct a more critical test of the partisan learning hypothesis based on a series of 
regressions models predicting both left-wing and right-wing partisan learning. For both types of 
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learning, two models are estimated in order to see how general political knowledge and interest 
influence the effect of ideological orientations on learning. Focusing on left-wing partisan 
learning, model 1 confirms the findings displayed in figure 2, even when controlling for several 
background characteristics: Compared to citizens who are neither right- nor left-leaning (the 
reference category), both left-wing and right-wing citizens learn significantly more about the 
activities of the left-wing parties during the campaign. Once we include political interest and 
general political knowledge, however (model 2), this effect of ideological orientation is 
substantially reduced, while the important role of general motivations and knowledge is reflected 
both in their highly significant coefficients as well as the dramatic increase in R-squared when 
these variables are included (from .19 to .46). A very similar pattern is found for right-wing party 
knowledge. People who are neither left- nor right-leaning learn significantly less than people 
with an ideological leaning, irrespective of direction. But once interest and general political 
knowledge are included, these effects disappear. 
***TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
While most research on selective exposure has focused on the US, in this study we extended 
research to a country that in many respects differ significantly from the US in terms of the 
opportunity structures for selective exposure. This, we argue, is important since there is ample 
evidence that media use is influenced by media environments as well as by individual-level 
variables (Aalberg et al. 2013, Althaus et al. 2009; Curran et al. 2009; Goldman and Mutz 2011; 
Shehata and Strömbäck, 2011). Because the Swedish broadcasting system provides better 
opportunity structures at the genre level than at the ideological level, our expectation was that 
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political interest would be more important than ideological leanings in explaining exposure to 
televised party interviews, without eradicating the importance of ideological leanings.  
 To briefly summarize, the results show support for several of our hypotheses. First, 
people with a right-leaning ideology were more likely to watch party leader-interviews with 
right-wing parties, while people with a left-leaning ideology were more likely to watch party 
leader-interviews with left-wing parties (H1a). These ideological selectivity effects – showing 
that citizens are more likely to seek-out attitude-consistent than attitude-discrepant information – 
held up even when controlling for a range of background, political motivation and resource 
factors. Second, however, the results indicate that basic political interest is substantially more 
important than ideological leaning in explaining why people watch party-leader interviews 
(H1c). Thus, rather than being driven by ideological preferences, exposure to party-leader 
interviews is primarily dependent on other types of motivations, that differentiates people who 
are neither right- nor left-leaning from those who are either right- or left-leaning (H1b). 
According to the data presented here and elsewhere (Oscarsson and Holmberg 2008), people 
lacking an ideological orientation are less interested in politics, pay less attention to politics in 
traditional news media, and are less knowledgeable about politics. Finally, these patterns were 
also replicated using partisan learning instead of exposure as the dependent variable. That is, we 
found very little evidence of partisan learning occurring at all (H2a). Instead, gaps in learning 
emerged between people who are neither right- nor left-leaning and those who are either right- or 
left-leaning and these gaps disappeared when accounting for political interest and general 
political knowledge (H2b and H2c). 
 Beyond these empirical findings, the main theoretical contribution of this study relates to 
the notion of opportunity structures for selective exposure. Defined as the availability of different 
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media, media formats, media genres and media content and the ease to which citizens can select 
media and media content based on their personal preferences, the concept of opportunity 
structures for selective exposure has several implications for theory and research on selective 
exposure. First, it is a reminder that empirical findings of selective exposure from any particular 
media environment and country, with its specific opportunity structure for selective exposure, 
cannot be transferred to media environments and countries with other opportunity structures for 
selective exposure. Second, it highlights and offers a framework for further research on how 
opportunities – a macro-level variable – influence and moderate the importance of individual 
preferences and abilities – micro-level variables. As part of this, it highlights the importance of 
distinguishing between different forms of selectivity in terms of what the opportunity structures 
look like and in terms of its presence and ubiquity. Third and related, it offers a framework for 
studies investigating differences in opportunity structures for selective exposure across different 
countries, media environments, media types and genres. With increasing media supply follows 
increasing selectivity, and media environments across democracies have all transformed from 
low- to high-choice media environments. However, the antecedents as well as the prevalence and 
consequences of selectivity might vary depending on the opportunity structures for different 
forms of selectivity. Fourth and related to the findings of this study, it suggests that media policy 
and policies aimed at strengthening public service broadcasting might offer a means towards 
counteracting selective exposure based on political or ideological preferences. This, of course, 
assumes that limited opportunity structures for selectivity with respect to broadcasting does not 
create incentives for those with strong preferences to migrate to other media where the 
opportunity structures are more conducive to selectivity based on political or ideological 
preferences or on political interest. This highlights the importance of understanding how 
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different opportunity structures for selectivity with respect to different media are linked to each 
other and people’s media use.  
 As this study is a single-country study, a key question though is how far the results can be 
generalized. While ultimately an empirical question, based on our reasoning above our best 
estimate is that the findings can be generalized to countries with similar opportunity structures 
for selective exposure. What matters is not the country per se, but the opportunity structures for 
different types of selective exposure. Concerning more everyday coverage of political affairs, 
this also means that it is likely the case that ideological selective exposure to television is even 
more limited than suggested by the results in this study, as there is usually less partisan 
programming on television than during election campaigns. This should however not limit 
selective exposure based on political interest. Again, the key is the opportunity structures for 
different forms of selective exposure. 
 In essence, if we want to understand selective exposure across contemporary media 
environments and countries, we must understand the different opportunity structures for different 
types of selective exposure. We cannot think of or study selective exposure as a matter of 
individual preferences and traits only. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive differences between left-wing, centre and right-wing citizens (mean values). 
 Age 
(years) 
Political Interest 
(0-6) 
News Attention 
(0-12) 
Political Knowledge 
(0-8) 
Left (n=819) 48 3.74 6.05 5.21 
Centre (n=461) 48 2.76 4.48 4.05 
Right (n=991) 51 3.75 6.34 5.48 
Note: The reported number of observations represents the minimum number of cases for each row. 
 
Table 2. The effects of ideological orientation on exposure to party leader interviews (ols). 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Ideological Orientation     
Centre -.79*** 
(.12) 
-.28* 
(.13) 
-.14 
(.15) 
.55** 
(.16) 
Right-leaning -.47*** 
(.10) 
-.42*** 
(.10) 
.88*** 
(.13) 
.99*** 
(.13) 
Political interest - .57*** 
(.03) 
- .72*** 
(.04) 
Political knowledge - .06* 
(.03) 
- .05 
(.04) 
High School .05 
(.15) 
-.15 
(.16) 
.11 
(.19) 
-.26 
(.20) 
University .18 
(.15) 
-.21 
(.16) 
.24 
(.19) 
-.32 
(.21) 
Income -.04 
(.03) 
-.06* 
(.03) 
-.08 
(.04) 
-.11** 
(.04) 
Man .04 
(.09) 
-.20* 
(.09) 
.13 
(.12) 
-.17 
(.12) 
Age .04*** 
(.00) 
.02*** 
(.00) 
.05*** 
(.00) 
.03*** 
(.00) 
     
Adjusted R2 .10 .27 .12 .28 
N 1864 1573 1864 1573 
Estimates are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Table 3. The effects of left-right orientation on partisan learning (ols). 
 Left-wing Party Knowledge Right-wing Party Knowledge 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Ideological orientation     
Left-wing .84*** (.16) -.03 (.15) .47*** (.09) .07 (.10) 
Right-wing 1.25*** (.16) .29* (.15) .43*** (.09) .05 (.09) 
Political interest - .45*** (.04) - .19*** (.03) 
Political knowledge - .45*** (.03) - .21*** (.02) 
High School .41* (.20) .15 (.20) .19 (.11) .05 (.12) 
University .89*** (.20) .20 (20) .46*** (.11) .09 (.13) 
Income .06 (.04) .03 (.03) .06** (.02) .04 (.02) 
Man .82*** (.12) .30** (.11) .32*** (.07) .04 (.07) 
Age .03*** (.00) -.00 (.00) .02*** (.00) .01*** (.00) 
     
Pseudo R2 .19 .46 .16 .31 
N 1084 924 1254 1057 
Estimates are unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Exposure to televised interviews and use of party websites (percent). 
 
Note: Total N=1864. The sample is weighted on gender, age, type of residence, education, political interest, general 
Internet use and voting choice in the 2006 national election.   
 
Figure 2. Partisan learning during the election campaign (percent correct answers). 
 
 
 
Note: Total n=1084 for estimates of left-wing party knowledge and 1254 for right-wing 
party knowledge. The sample is weighted on gender, age, type of residence, education, 
political interest, general Internet use and voting choice in the 2006 national election. 
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